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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_ 
 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge 
 
 Muadhdhin Bey appeals the district court’s denial of his 
motion to suppress physical evidence seized from him during 
a search incident to a Terry stop.  Although we agree with the 
district court’s conclusion that the initial stop was supported by 
reasonable suspicion, we conclude that the continuation of that 
stop, after police should have realized that Bey did not 
resemble the fleeing suspect they were looking for, violated the 
Fourth Amendment.  Accordingly, we hold that the district 
court erred in denying Bey’s motion to suppress.  We will 
therefore reverse the court’s denial of Bey’s motion to suppress 
and vacate the judgment of conviction. 
 
I. 
A. Factual Background 
 
 Police Stop a Car Containing Amir Robinson 
 
At around 10 p.m. on March 28, 2016, Philadelphia 
Police Officers William Fritz and Brandon McPoyle saw a 
white Buick fail to come to a complete stop at a stop sign.  The 
Buick continued into a neighborhood that officers described as 
a “violent area,” known for drug distribution.  After following 
the car for three blocks, the officers turned on the overhead 
lights of their marked patrol car and pulled the car over.  The 
car contained three men – the driver, a front passenger, and a 
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rear driver’s-side passenger.  Amir Robinson was the front 
passenger; Lionel Burke was the back seat passenger.  Officer 
Fritz would later describe Robinson as an average-sized Black 
male who was wearing a “red hoodie or jacket.”  (App. 60-61.)   
 
Each of the three occupants produced identification, 
which officers returned after a warrant check failed to disclose 
any outstanding warrants.  However, officers noticed the smell 
of marijuana and saw marijuana residue on the car’s floor while 
attempting to identify the passengers.  Consequently, they 
decided to remove the three men from the car to search for 
drugs.   
 
The rear passenger, Lionel Burke, was removed and 
frisked first.  After Burke was frisked, but before McPoyle 
returned him to the car, Fritz noticed a gun on the floor of the 
back seat where Burke had been sitting.  Fritz recovered the 
gun, verified that it was real, and told McPoyle to arrest Burke.  
Before McPoyle could handcuff Burke, Burke “did a football 
maneuver where he spun around” McPoyle and fled 
northbound.  (App 59.)  Beginning at approximately 10:01 
p.m., the officers broadcast their locations over police radio.1   
 
Robinson Flees the Traffic Stop 
 
When Fritz looked back toward the Buick, he noticed 
that the front passenger door was open and Robinson (the front 
passenger) had also fled.  Fritz assumed that Robinson must 
have “gone westbound,” which was opposite of Burke’s 
direction of flight.  (App. 63, 85.)  Seconds after 10:02 p.m., 
McPoyle radioed that he had apprehended and arrested Burke.2  
At 10:03 p.m., Fritz radioed that they had recovered a gun, that 
the driver of the car was in custody, and that the passenger had 
fled.      
 
At 10:04 p.m., approximately three minutes after Fritz 
called for back-up, Officer John Madara arrived at the scene, 
and Fritz briefly described Robinson to Madara.  At 10:06 
                                              
1 United States v. Bey, No. 16-CR-290, 2017 WL 875364, at 
*2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2017). 
2 Id. 
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p.m., Madara relayed that description over the radio.3  Madara 
broadcast that Robinson was a Black male, approximately 
6’0”-6’1”, 160-170 pounds, wearing dark blue pants and a red 
hoodie and headed west from their location.  Notably, the 
description of Robinson did not mention a long beard or any 
facial hair. 
Officers Ernest Powell and Philip Cherry heard Officer 
Fritz’s initial call for back-up and Officer Madara’s subsequent 
broadcast of Robinson’s description.  The officers arrived at 
the scene just after 10:06 p.m., and Powell spoke with Madara 
about the description of Robinson.  Powell was able to view a 
photographic picture of Robinson on the computer screen in 
his patrol car (the Mobile Data Terminal or “MDT”).  Having 
viewed the MDT picture and with a full description including 
name, address, age, ethnicity, approximate height and weight, 
and clothing, Officers Powell and Cherry began searching for 
Robinson in the general direction of his flight.4  They started 
their pursuit of Robinson at 10:07 p.m.5  Given their experience 
and knowledge of the area, as well as the very short time 
interval involved, Powell and Cherry assumed Robinson may 
be nearby at Lid’s Café, a local bar that was only one block 
away, where he might try to blend in.   
 
Officers Stop Bey, Believing Bey to be Robinson 
 
Less than one minute after meeting with Officer 
Madara, and mere seconds after seeing Robinson’s picture on 
their MDT, Officers Powell and Cherry saw an individual, who 
would later be identified as Muadhdhin Bey, walking out of 
Lid’s Café.    
 
Bey was a 32 year-old, dark-skinned African American 
man with a long beard.  He weighed about 200 pounds and was 
wearing black sweatpants and a red puffer jacket with a hood.  
Amir Robinson, the suspect officers were searching for, on the 
other hand, was a 21 year-old, light-skinned African American 
man with very little hair under his chin and a tattoo on his neck.  
He weighed around 160-170 pounds and was wearing dark 
blue pants and a red hoodie (or red jacket) when he fled from 
                                              
3 Id. 
4 Id. at *3. 
5 Id. 
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the police.  Although Bey’s clothing resembled the description 
of Robinson’s clothing, Bey was more than a decade older, 
much darker in complexion, much heavier and had 
significantly more facial hair than Robinson.    
 
When police noticed Bey walking out of Lid’s Café, 
they could not see Bey’s face because he was facing away from 
them, but they noticed his red, hooded puffer jacket and black 
sweatpants.6  Officer Powell testified that he could not identify 
Bey’s race upon first seeing him, but he later testified that when 
he saw Bey, he told Officer Cherry “[h]ey, that’s the red jacket, 
the black guy, red jacket.”7  (App. 115.)  Both officers stated 
that they drew their guns, approached Bey, and ordered him to 
show his hands.  Bey immediately put his hands in the air and 
turned around to face the officers.     
 
Officers Continue to Detain Bey After He Turns 
Around 
 
At this point, the officers’ testimony conflicted and the 
district court rejected some of the testimony because the Court 
found that Officer Powell was not completely credible.  Officer 
Powell testified that the scene was well-lit and his view of Bey 
was unobstructed.  At the suppression hearing, Powell testified 
that he asked Bey if he had a weapon and Bey told him that he 
had a gun on his waist, which Officer Cherry recovered.8  
                                              
6 As the district court noted, “the parties dispute the content 
of the verbal description that Madara gave Powell.  At the 
suppression hearing Powell testified that Madara told him 
Robinson was wearing a red jacket (as opposed to a hoodie).  
The arrest report and all of Madara’s radio broadcasts 
describe Robinson as wearing a red hoodie.”  Bey, 2017 WL 
875364, at *3 n.4.   
7 The Government asked Officer Powell: “When you arrive at 
[Lid’s café] and you saw the person who turned out to be 
[Bey], did the person that appeared to you appear to be a 
black male?”  Officer Powell responded, “Yes.”  (App. 169.) 
8 Bey, 2017 WL 875364, at *5.  The district court explained 
why it did not believe this portion of Officer Powell’s 
testimony: 
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However, Officer Powell also testified at that same hearing that 
he told Bey to get on the ground, that Bey complied, and he 
(Powell) “approached and removed from [Bey’s] front 
waistband a black .45 caliber handgun” himself.  (App. 119.)  
No matter which account is true, it is clear that police recovered 
a gun from Bey.  
 
At 10:08 p.m., approximately eight minutes after 
Robinson fled, Officer Powell broadcast “gun recovered, one 
in custody.”9  Officer Madara testified that when he heard 
                                              
Powell first disclosed it during a meeting with 
the U.S. Attorney and an FBI agent in December 
2016—over eight months after Bey’s arrest. The 
arrest memo, which was entered into evidence at 
the suppression hearing, does not include 
anything reflecting this alleged Statement. In 
relevant part, it states: 
Police ordered the male to stop and show his 
hands to police. Police had their weapons drawn 
because of the nature of the job, a person with a 
gun. The male complied by dropping to the 
ground as ordered by police. Police conducted a 
safety frisk of the male, at that time police 
recovered a black in color tenifer finished Glock 
37 .45 ACP handgun from his front waistband. 
 
Id. at *4.  The court also found that Officer Powell did not 
mention the alleged confession during the state preliminary 
hearing either.  Therefore, the court held: 
 
Given the importance of the alleged admission 
from Bey that a gun was in his waistband to any 
prosecution, and the incriminating effect of such 
an admission, the fact that it was not included in 
the arrest memo or mentioned in Powell’s state 
court testimony—and only surfaced eight 
months after the arrest, during a meeting in 
preparation for this case—undermines the 
credibility of Powell’s testimony on this point.   
 
Id. at *4–5. 
9 Id. at *5. 
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Officer Powell’s 10:08 p.m. broadcast, he drove to Lid’s Café 
to see if the person in custody was actually Robinson.  Officer 
Madara arrived at the bar between 10:08 p.m. and 10:09 p.m.10  
When he arrived, Officer Powell and Officer Cherry told him 
that Bey was not Robinson.11  Officer Madara then viewed 
Robinson’s picture on his MDT.  At 10:09 p.m., he broadcast 
that police had arrested a different male and “[w]e’re still 
looking for Amir Robinson.”12 
B. Procedural History 
 
 Bey was transported back to the police station and 
charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm.  He 
subsequently moved to suppress the gun arguing that the 
description that Officers Powell and Cherry were given was too 
generic to support reasonable suspicion to seize him.  He also 
argued that even if police had reasonable suspicion to justify 
the initial detention, that suspicion dissipated when Bey turned 
around and the officers saw his face, his size, his facial hair, 
and the age discrepancy between him and Robinson.  Bey 
argues that because police had seen a picture of Robinson 
moments before seizing him, the officers therefore knew, or 
should have known, that he (Bey) was not Robinson. 
 
 The district court correctly ruled that the seizure 
occurred the moment Bey submitted to police authority by 
raising his hands and turning to face the officers who had 
drawn their guns.13  The court found that the officers had 
                                              
10 Id. at *6. 
11 Id. 
12 Id.  Officer Powell’s version of events following the arrest 
of Bey differed.  Powell claimed that after arresting Bey, he 
and Officer Cherry drove Bey back to the initial location for 
an identification.  Given that Officer Madara’s account 
matched the radio dispatch records, however, the district 
court concluded that Officer Madara’s testimony was true.  
Id. 
13 Bey, 2017 WL 875364, at *7 (“Bey’s compliance was not 
momentary; he continued to comply with police commands 
throughout the stop and frisk. Therefore, Bey submitted to the 
officers’ show of authority, and was seized for Fourth 
Amendment purposes, when he turned around with his hands 
raised.”). 
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reasonable suspicion to justify that seizure based on numerous 
factors including the reliability of the description, the physical 
and temporal proximity of the detention to the vehicle stop, and 
Bey’s initial appearance.14  The court found that “[t]he 
description was sufficiently particularized to permit the police 
to be reasonably selective in determining whom to stop for 
investigation.”15    
 
 The district court also ruled that reasonable suspicion 
did not dissipate when Bey turned to face the officers, even 
though they then were able to get a good look at his face and 
features.16  While acknowledging that Bey is darker-skinned, 
much heavier, and significantly older than Robinson, the court 
noted that those comparisons came not from the photo that 
officers saw on the MDT at the scene, but from a photo of 
Robinson that was taken six months later when he was finally 
arrested.17  Therefore, in the court’s eyes, the post-hoc 
comparison of the physical features of Robinson and Bey was 
of little probative value because it did not address whether the 
photo officers saw sufficiently resembled Bey the night of the 
incident.18 
 
 At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the court 
denied Bey’s motion to suppress, and this appeal followed.19  
 
II. 
  
                                              
14 Id. at *10. 
15 Id. (“It is not unreasonable that a police officer would 
perform an investigatory seizure of a black male wearing a 
red hooded jacket and dark pants under these circumstances, 
given the geographic and temporal proximity of the seizure to 
the car stop, and the fact that the location was a high crime 
area.”). 
16 Id. at *11–12. 
17 Id. at *11. 
18 Id. 
19 We review de novo the district court’s conclusion that the 
detention and arrest were consistent with Fourth Amendment 
limitations; we review for clear error the court’s findings of 
fact.  United States v. Harple, 202 F.3d 194, 196 (3d Cir. 
1999). 
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The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and 
seizures.”20  Evidence obtained through unreasonable searches 
and seizures must be suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous 
tree.”21  Generally, for a search or seizure to be reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment, it must be effectuated with a 
warrant based upon probable cause.22  Warrantless searches 
and seizures are presumptively unreasonable unless the 
Government satisfies its burden of establishing that one of the 
exceptions to the warrant requirement applies.23  In Terry v. 
Ohio,24 the Supreme Court created one such exception.  Under 
Terry, police may “conduct a brief investigatory stop when the 
officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal 
activity is afoot.”25  However, in order to lawfully detain 
someone under Terry – even briefly – the Government must 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that “each 
individual act constituting a search or seizure” was reasonable.  
More specifically, each aspect of the detention must be 
justified by a reasonable suspicion.26 
 
As we noted at the outset, Bey argues that the district 
court erred in finding that the officers had reasonable suspicion 
                                              
20 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
21 United States v. Brown, 448 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2006).  
22 Id. (citing United States v. Robertson, 305 F.3d 164, 167 
(3d Cir. 2002)). 
23 See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991) (“It 
remains a cardinal principle that searches conducted outside 
the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or 
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and 
well-delineated exceptions.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
24 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
25 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000). 
26 United States v. Ritter, 416 F.3d 256, 261 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(“On a motion to suppress, the government bears the burden 
of showing that each individual act constituting a search or 
seizure under the Fourth Amendment was reasonable.”); see 
also United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n.14 (1974) 
(“[T]he controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings 
should impose no greater burden than proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence.”). 
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to seize him under Terry v. Ohio.27  We determine if police had 
reasonable suspicion by considering the totality of the 
circumstances.28  This standard requires us to credit reasonable 
deductions drawn by police in light of their experience and 
training.29  However, reasonable suspicion unequivocally 
demands that the detaining officers must have a particularized 
and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped 
for criminal activity.30  The ultimate question is whether the 
record is sufficient to establish that police had a reasonable 
suspicion based on  
articulated facts that would justify the search or seizure of the 
individual in question.31   
 
The record here is sufficient to establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that officers had reasonable 
suspicion to initially stop Bey.  However, the Government 
failed to produce sufficient evidence to justify his continued 
detention once he turned around and they could compare him 
to the description of Robinson that had just been broadcast.  
 
A. 
 
Bey argues that the broadcast description of Robinson 
was so excessively general that it could not support reasonable 
suspicion and the district court’s contrary conclusion is 
inconsistent with our opinion in United States v. Brown.32   
 
In Brown, we invalidated a purported Terry stop that 
was based only on a generalized description of the suspect.  
There, police were given a description of two suspects who 
allegedly attempted a robbery.33  The victim identified the 
                                              
27 392 U.S. at 30 (holding that an officer may, consistent with 
the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop 
when the officer has a reasonable, “articulable suspicion” that 
criminal activity is afoot). 
28 United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). 
29 Id.  
30 See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981). 
31 See Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 206 (3d Cir. 
2003). 
32 448 F.3d 239 (3d Cir. 2006). 
33 Id. at 241–42. 
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suspects as two African American males between fifteen and 
twenty years of age, wearing dark, hooded sweatshirts and 
running south on 22nd street.34  One male was described as 
5’8” and the other as 6’0”.35  On the basis of this description, 
police stopped and frisked two men: both African American 
males, both approximately the same height as the suspects.36  
The men who were stopped and frisked, however, were twenty-
seven years old and thirty-one years old, and both had full 
beards.37  In holding that the defendants’ seizure went beyond 
the limitations of Terry, we explained that the description was 
so “wildly wide of target” compared to the appearance of the 
two men who were detained that it was not reasonable under 
Terry to stop them.38  We explained, “even the less stringent 
standard of reasonable suspicion cannot be met by a 
description that paints with this broad a brush.”39  We 
concluded that “[b]y no logic does [this description], by itself, 
support reasonable suspicion.”40 
  
The situation here is different.  When these officers 
approached Bey, they could see that he was an African 
American man wearing clothing similar to that worn by the 
fleeing suspect and he was where police expected to find that 
suspect.  Officers could not see Bey’s face when they initially 
detained him.  The totality of the circumstances, including 
Bey’s temporal and physical proximity to the traffic stop, the 
description of Robinson’s clothing, the direction of Robinson’s 
flight, the officers’ familiarity with the neighborhood and their 
belief that the fleeing suspect may have tried to blend in at 
Lid’s Café, coalesce to justify the police officers’ initial 
approach to investigate Bey.  Police also had reason to suspect 
that the person they were looking for was armed.  Accordingly, 
police were justified in drawing their guns and ordering Bey to 
raise his hands and turn around.  However, the validity of the 
initial Terry stop does not end our inquiry. 
 
                                              
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 242. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 248. 
39 Id. at 248. 
40 Id. 
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B. 
 
Bey argues that he, unlike Robinson, had a long beard, 
is more than a decade older than Robinson, much heavier, and 
significantly darker.  Moreover, he did not appear to be 
sweating or short of breath.  Therefore, nothing suggested that 
he had just run a block from pursuing police officers.  Bey 
asserts that these factors would have dissipated the officers’ 
reasonable suspicion when he turned, and they saw his face.  
We agree. 
 
The brief investigative stop allowed under Terry, is just 
that; a brief stop to allow police to investigate.41  The initial 
stop does not justify an arrest, prolonged detention, or a stop 
that lasts any longer than is reasonably necessary to 
investigate.  As the Supreme Court has explained: “[A]n 
investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer 
than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.”42  
Moreover, “[i]t is the State’s burden to demonstrate that the 
seizure it seeks to justify on the basis of a reasonable suspicion 
was sufficiently limited in scope and duration to satisfy the 
conditions of an investigative seizure.”43  “Once reasonable 
suspicion has been dispelled, even a very brief extension of 
detention without consent or reasonable suspicion violates the 
Fourth Amendment.”44  An investigative stop must therefore 
cease once reasonable suspicion dissipates.45  “[W]ithout 
                                              
41 See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123 (“[A]n officer may, 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, 
investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, 
articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.”) 
(emphasis added).  
42 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). 
43 Id. (emphasis added). 
44 United States v. De La Cruz, 703 F.3d 1193, 1197 (10th 
Cir. 2013) (internal quotations omitted); see also United 
States v. Davis, 430 F.3d 345, 357 (6th Cir. 2005) (“The 
Fourth Amendment allows police to detain a suspect on 
reasonable suspicion only for as long as it takes for the police 
to test the validity of their suspicions.”). 
45 See, e.g., United States v. Babwah, 972 F.2d 30, 34 (2d Cir. 
1992) (holding that agents’ continued detention of suspect 
13 
 
additional reasonable suspicion, [an] officer must allow the 
seized person to depart once the purpose of the stop has 
concluded.”46  We have stressed that, “[i]t is the State’s burden 
to demonstrate that the seizure it seeks to justify on the basis 
of a reasonable suspicion was sufficiently limited in scope and 
duration to satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure.”47  
The Government must satisfy that burden by a preponderance 
of the evidence.48   
 
For the reasons that we explained in part A, the district 
court correctly concluded that “[t]he initial stop of Bey was 
justified . . . . When Powell and Cherry seized Bey, they had 
reasonable suspicion to believe that he [may have been] 
Robinson.”49  But the seizure should have terminated once that 
suspicion was no longer reasonable.50  Thus, once Bey turned 
around, officers should have noticed the clear differences in 
appearance and age between the two men.   
 
The district court did appreciate the extent to which 
Bey’s appearance differed from the description of Robinson 
that had been broadcast.  The court explained:   
 
[the] photograph of Robinson that was entered 
into evidence revealed that Robinson is a light-
skinned black male of youthful appearance, with 
a tattoo covering the front of his neck, a short 
moustache, narrow sideburns, and a small 
amount of facial hair underneath his chin.51 
 
                                              
became illegal once their reasonable suspicion proved 
unfounded). 
46 Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015). 
47 See Royer, 460 U.S. at 500.  
48 Matlock, 415 U.S. at 177 n.14 (“[T]he controlling burden 
of proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater 
burden than proof by a preponderance of the evidence.”). 
49 Bey, 2017 WL 875364, at *11. 
50 See Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614 (“[W]ithout additional 
reasonable suspicion, [an] officer must allow the seized 
person to depart once the purpose of the stop has 
concluded.”). 
51 Bey, 2017 WL 875364, at *3. 
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The court discounted the apparent differences between Bey 
and Robinson, however, because the Government’s 
photograph of Robinson was not the MDT image that officers 
saw that night, but rather a photograph taken six months later.  
The court therefore concluded that it “c[ould not] evaluate the 
differences between the photograph that Powell saw of 
Robinson and what Bey looked like when [Powell] saw him 
exiting Lid’s [Café].”52  Consequently, the court held that “the 
probative value of the photograph was questionable,”53 and 
apparently concluded that Bey had therefore failed to prove 
that reasonable suspicion did not continue after he turned 
around.  However, that conclusion punished Bey for the 
Government’s failure to introduce the MDT image that police 
viewed at the time of the incident. 
  
The court’s analysis required Bey to prove that his 
appearance was not reasonably close to Robinson’s the night 
of the incident.  However, it was the Government’s burden to 
prove that Bey did sufficiently resemble Robinson to justify 
the continued detention, and the Government had to do so by a 
preponderance of the evidence.54  Based on the available 
evidence – the photograph that the government did submit – 
the differences between the two men are as obvious as they are 
significant.55  For reasons known only to the Government, 
Robinson’s MDT image was not introduced, but Bey cannot be 
prejudiced by the Government’s failure of proof.   
 
We explained how a similar discrepancy between 
description and actual appearance fatally undermined 
reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop in Brown.  There 
                                              
52 Id. at *11. 
53 Id. 
54 See Ritter, 416 F.3d at 261. (“On a motion to suppress, the 
government bears the burden of showing that each individual 
act constituting a search or seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment was reasonable.”). 
55 In addition, reasonable suspicion is also undermined by the 
district court’s finding that “Bey did not appear to be out of 
breath” when police saw him and approached him mere 
minutes after he would have had to have sprinted away from 
Officer Fritz if he were Robinson.  Bey, 2017 WL 875364, at 
*4. 
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we noted the generic nature of the description that was 
broadcast for two robbery suspects and compared it to the 
appearance of Brown and his codefendant when police stopped 
them pursuant to Terry.  We explained: 
 
[T]he match of [the defendants] to even [the] 
most general of descriptions was hardly close. 
Among other things, the robbery suspects were 
described as between 15 and 20 years of age, but 
on the date of the stop Brown was 28 years old 
and Smith was 31 years old. Moreover, both 
Brown and Smith had full beards and the 
description of the suspects included no mention 
of any facial hair.  Indeed, about the only thing 
Brown and Smith had in common with the 
suspects was that they were [B]lack.  What we 
have is a description that, while general, is wildly 
wide of target.  By no logic does it, by itself, 
support reasonable suspicion.56 
 
Once Bey turned around and police had a good look at 
his face and features, the situation here was analogous to the 
situation in Brown.  
  
Bey’s continued detention once he turned around is also 
analogous to the circumstances analyzed by the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. Watson.57  
There, two officers were searching for a man named Chauncy 
Butler.58  The officers had a description of Butler and a 
photograph of Butler from a previous arrest.59  Butler was 
described as a nineteen year-old black male; 5’10” to 6’0” tall; 
black hair; 155 to 180 pounds.60  While searching for Butler, 
the officers spotted the defendant, Watson.61  Watson was then 
twenty-five years old, 6’2” tall, and weighed 180 pounds.62  
The officers stopped and frisked Watson, based on his 
                                              
56 Brown, 448 F.3d at 248. 
57 787 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2015). 
58 Id. at 102.   
59 Id. at 103. 
60 Id. 
61 Id.  
62 Id. 
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purported resemblance to the actual suspect.63  There, as here, 
the police recovered a gun during that search.64  Watson moved 
to suppress, arguing that no reasonable officer could have 
continued to believe he was Butler after getting a good look at 
him (Watson).65  The district court agreed with Watson, 
finding that as was “evident from a comparison of the 
photographs” of the two men, “Butler and Watson do not look 
[a]like.”66  The district court held that the differences in the 
men’s age, skin tone, weight and facial features were clear:  
 
In addition to their different facial features, skin 
tone, height, and weight, Watson is over five 
years older than Butler. Vaccaro's generic 
description of the similarities between Watson 
and Butler undermines the contention that he 
reasonably believed them to be the same 
person.67 
 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
agreed.  The court held that “the search of Watson was 
objectively unreasonable” because “a reasonable officer, once 
he had had a chance to view Watson up close, could not have 
reasonably believed he was Butler.”68  The court held that the 
“material differences [between the men] would have been 
apparent to any reasonable officer[.]”69   
 
Here, the distinction between Robinson and Bey is even 
more pronounced because there is a greater age disparity in 
addition to the other differences in skin tone, facial hair, height 
and weight.  Because officers recovered the gun after they had 
a good look at Bey and should have known that he was not 
Robinson, the district court should have granted the motion to 
suppress.  To the extent that the MDT image police had of 
Robinson may have more closely resembled Bey than the 
image the Government introduced at the suppression hearing, 
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65 Id. at 102–04. 
66 Id. at 104. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 105. 
69 Id. 
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the Government’s failure to produce that image fatally 
undermines its attempt to prove that the police acted 
reasonably in detaining Bey after they had a good look at him.  
The two men “simply do not look [a]like.”70 
 
III. CONCLUSION. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the district 
court’s denial of Bey’s motion to suppress and vacate the 
judgment of conviction. 
                                              
70 Id. 
